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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a historical overview of Panama’s ties with the “two Chinas”, 
focusing initially on Asian migration to the Isthmus of Panama before the territory 
became part of New Granada (Colombia). This migration was the result of Chinese 
labourers being recruited to work for the Panama railway construction company 
from 1850-1855 and, a few decades later, for construction of the French Canal 
and the Panama Canal. This will be followed by an examination of the Republic of 
China (ROC or Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) respective policies 
towards Panama.
In addition, this paper analyses the new social, political, and economic scenarios 
resulting from Panama’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China in June 2017. Panama’s engagement with China, particularly 
its links with China’s signature Belt and Road Initiative presents opportunities 
and challenges for the Central American country as it balances these with its 
national priorities.
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1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Panama’s relationship with China dates back to 1909 and the dying days of the Qing dynasty. In the early 20th century, the Chinese empire established a consulate general in Panama to serve Chinese immigrants living there. Following the 1911 Hsinhai (Xinhai) revolution, and the subsequent founding 
of the Republic of China (ROC), Panama was one of the first countries in the world to officially recognize the 
new Asian nation. The ROC soon after established a diplomatic office in Panama City, which was elevated to 
embassy level in 1954. On the other side of the world, the Government of Panama opened its embassy in China 
in 1933. Panama has the longest uninterrupted relations with the ROC of any country (Taiwan News, 2011).
Panama maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC even after it lost control of mainland China in 1949 
and was relegated to the island of Taiwan. But June 12, 2017, when the Central American country established 
relations the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), marked the beginning of a new stage in Panamanian diplomacy. 
1.1. BACKGROUND OF INDEPENDENCE:  
        CHINESE ‘COOLIES’ AND CONSTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS AND CANALS.
Since the earliest days of Spanish colonialism, foreigners have sought a means of rapid and cheap inter-
ocean travel to replace the lengthy and expensive option of passing around Cape Horn. 
The subsequent construction of railways, the French Canal, and later the Panama Canal across the Isthmus, 
demanded thousands of workers. “Coolies”, the pejorative 19th-century name used for workers from China and 
other Asian countries, were recruited to carry out the back-breaking work. In general, they were hired for a 
specified period of not less than eight years. They were given transportation, a salary, and accommodation, but 
were frequently subjected to abuse and mistreatment.
The first Chinese labourers were dispatched from Guangzhou and Hong Kong in 1847. Two British 
companies, Trait and Company and Syme Muir and Company, were involved in setting up this deal. By 1855 
American companies, such as Boston’s Sampson and Tappan, were also involved in the coolie trade, shipping 
labourers to countries like Brazil and Peru. (Connelly & Cornejo Bustamante, 1992).
The construction of the Panama railway in 1850-1855, and later of the ill-fated French Canal, brought 
substantial Chinese migration to the territory of New Granada (Colombia). According to Connelly and Cornejo 
Bustamante, the Qing government’s official policy towards the emigration of its subjects it went through three 
stages: 1) from the beginning of the trade until 1859, it prohibited emigration; 2) from 1860 to 1874, it allowed 
emigration, distinguishing voluntary emigration and coolie trade and trying to regulate the latter; 3) from 
1874 until the end of the dynasty in 1911, it banned the coolie trade and tried to protect migrants by sending 
diplomats and consular officials.
The trip to Panama was arduous. In 1852, for instance, 300 Chinese emigrants were shipped to Panama, 
with 72 dying on the crossing; in 1853, 425 Chinese embarked, 96 of whom died on the crossing; on March 
30, 1854, 705 Chinese arrived on the Isthmus of Panama, with 11 having died on the journey. When the 
railway was completed in 1855, there were 1,262 Chinese residing the territory. When the Panama railway was 
completed in 1855, there were 1,262 Chinese residing in the territory; during that year, the Chinese government 
asked the United States to represent the interests of their subjects in the Americas, and thus New Granada 
(Colombia), and communicate to the Civil and Military Chief of the State of Panama, who was the authority in 
the territory Panama, that the United States would represent the interests of the subjects of the Chinese Empire 
(Mon, 2005).
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In 1879, Paris hosted the International Congress for Interoceanic Canal Studies. Delegates from 136 
countries whose workers had an important role to play in the construction of a canal on the Isthmus, including 
China, were present. Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French diplomat and businessman who built the Suez Canal, 
introduced the head of various subcommittees, quickly described the roles of each, and then read the full list 
of delegates, asking them to stand up to make himself known. Mr. Li-Shu-Chang, first secretary of the Chinese 
delegation in London, received the longest applause, since attendees hoped that China would provide the 
largest number of workers to excavate the canal (Mccullough, 1976).
From 1882 to 1889, work on the French Canal continued, and although the workforce was not as large as 
expected, Chinese migration continued. Some Chinese immigrants who had tried their luck in the California 
gold mines returned to Panama, but not to the excavation. They instead scattered throughout the territory to 
establish retail stores and other small businesses. At that time, there were no known immigration restrictions.
By 1882, the Chinese presence in Panama was significant enough to found the First Society, called “Way 
On”, to help the Chinese elderly who fell ill by placing them in hospitals or asylums. It was reorganized in 1904 
and renamed the Chinese Benevolence Society in Panama (Mon, 2005).
1.2. LATE IMPERIAL CHINA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND THE NEW  
        PANAMANIAN STATE 1903-1941
Formal relations between Panama (then part of Colombia) and Imperial China began in the late nineteenth 
century as result of the coolies’ presence. In this era, the formation of international investigative commissions 
was unusual; despite that, France, Great Britain, and China established one to assess the status of coolies 
under the administration of Spain and its colonial government in Cuba. They found that that a quarter of a 
million Chinese had been sent to Cuba, Peru, and other parts of the Caribbean and Latin America between the 
1840s and 1870s. More troubling were the individual testimonies, which detailed the hellish captivity in which 
they lived, which ultimately caused the commission to call for the coolie trade’s abolition (Yun, 2008).
Following independence from Colombia in 1903, the new Panamian government adopted the discriminatory 
Decree 42 of June 24 in 1909, which suspended Chinese citizenship cards, thus restricting the ability of 
naturalized Chinese citizens to bring their wives and children to the territory. In 1911, the country’s first census 
identified 2,003 Chinese in the country; the authorities, however, estimated that there were probably around 
7,000. Modesto Justiniani, Deputy in the National Assembly, proposed a bill seeking the expulsion of all Chinese 
from Panama (Guardia, 2015). President Belisario Porras did not approve the bill, but he issued Executive 
Decree No. 2 of January 11, 1912, which required Chinese who came to Panama as employees of the trading 
houses to deposit two hundred and fifty balboas (B. 250.00) in the National Bank (Banco del Estado) in order 
to guarantee that they would vacate the country upon their contract’s expiration. They were, under this decree, 
forced to notify provincial governors of their departure at least 48 hours in advance. 
On March 24, 1913, however, Panama banned the immigration of Chinese, Turks, Syrians, and North Africans 
of the Turkish race, also setting guidelines for the creation and operation of associations formed by people 
of those origins (Tejada Mora, 2013). Law 50, required these organizations (or individuals) to register and re-
register every six months after depositing $500; non-compliance with the law could lead to fines or expulsion 
from the country. On September 9, 1913, in defiance of the Panamanian authorities, the Chinese colony, with 
the support of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Consul in Panama, announced that it 
would not register. In response, President Porras cancelled his plans to recognize the Chinese Consulate and 
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ordered Chinese officials Samuel Sung Young (Hsiung Chung-chin) to leave the country. But after international 
debate, US diplomats defended the immigrants, and the Chinese community comprising 7,267 people decided 
to register. 
By 1926, attitudes had hardened sufficiently that Panama expressly prohibited Chinese immigration. Until 
March 1928, a quota of ten people per year was allowed for those from prohibited nations.  In 1932, Panama 
prohibited all entry to the country of Chinese and other races that did not have Spanish as their mother tongue 
(Kam Rios, 2015). 
Further restrictions on Chinese immigration were imposed by Panama in 1941. Article 23 of Arnulfo Arias’s 
Political Constitution of 1941 declared that “immigration of foreigners will be regulated by law ... they are 
prohibited immigration: the black race whose language is not the Castilian, the yellow race and the races 
originating from India, Asia Minor and North Africa”. This same year, the National Assembly approved Law 24 
of March 24, 1941, which declared that prohibited immigration races could not engage in commercial activities 
or liberal professions (some 20 Panamanian professions including medicine, nursing, dentistry, and social 
work) or possess commercial stocks surpassing 25 percent of the organization’s capital.
Indeed, in Republic of Panama’s first decade, Chinese immigrants were subjected to systematic legal and 
social discriminatory treatment. But over the following decades, new generations of Chinese overcame this 
discrimination and the community came to prosper.
2. THE PANAMA CANAL, TAIWAN AND CHINA, 1971-2017
After World War II, Panama followed the US and did not recognize the Peoples Republic of China. Panama 
instead retained ties with the government in exile in Taiwan. In 1972, however, while the US and other countries 
recognized the PRC, Panama maintained relations with Taiwan, a decision from which it hoped to reap benefits 
(Gandásegui, 2005).
Following sustained lobbying campaign, US President Jimmy Carter agreed in 1977 returned the Panama 
Canal Zone to its namesake. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties established that the United States would over a 
23-year period return the territory to Panama and in 1999 the occupation would end, with the orderly and 
total transfer of the administration to Panamanian hands. In 1999, President Mireya Moscoso’s government 
officially took over the Canal, promising “to administer the Interoceanic Canal that was about to revert to 
Panama with transparency, efficiency and responsibility” (Herrera Montenegro, 2009).
The treaties signed by the United States and Panama in relation to the Panama Canal include the Torrijos-
Carter Treaty and the Treaty Concerning Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. It is notable 
that the PRC was the only UN Security Council member to not sign the Neutrality Treaty.
This joint administration process was designed to demonstrate Panama’s administrative abilities and usher 
in a new period in the country’s relations with the other countries using the Canal, despite the effects the crisis 
had on the world economy and international trade. This process also provided an opportunity for Panama to 
manage the Canal’s expansion so that it could continue to be competitive as hegemonic interests, such as that 
of the PRC, changed.
With the constitutional reforms of 2004, however, the special regime of the Panama Canal Authority created 
title XIV, granting to the Panama Canal Authority (APC) the exclusive powers of administration, operation, 
conservation, maintenance, and modernization of the Panama Canal (Panama National Assembly, 2012). This 
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reform aimed to limit political influence over technical decisions. The Panamanian constitution recognizes 
that the Canal is the nation’s inalienable heritage, must be open to the peaceful and uninterrupted transit of 
ships from all nations, and today holds substantial global strategic value in maritime trade. 
During this period, Taiwan interests in Panama were twofold. First, due to its export-oriented economy, the 
government intended to use the Canal as part of its global trading network. Secondly, Taiwan relied on Panama 
an important diplomatic linchpin in its diminishing international official standing.
Taiwanese economic involvement in Panama, while not enormous, was significant for both countries. 
According to the Taiwan Investment Commission, total investments in Panama stand at $1.6 million among 
them, those of the shipping company Evergreen Marine and the Mega International Commercial Bank stand 
out, with respective amounts of $850 million and $20 million (La Crítica, 2017).
In 2016, Panamanian shipments to mainland China ($35.5 million) already exceeded the value of exports to 
the island to Taiwan ($26.8 million). In other words, Panama’s diplomatic normalization with Beijing was likely 
not needed to export goods to the PRC (Guevara Man, 2019). 
Taiwan, on the other hand, provided economic support to Panama to reinforce international cooperation, 
boost investment in and loans to small fishermen, support technical assistance for the modernization of 
information technologies applied to agriculture, and scholarships and donations for social works. 
While the PRC’s Chinese involvement in Panama dates back to the 1991 Hutchinson-Whampoa investments, 
China’s expanded trade interests in Latin America over the past two decades are a recent phenomenon, 
displacing traditional trading partners like the United States and Europe. In 1997 Hutchinson Ports-PPC (tied 
to the Hutchinson Port Holding Group, and owners of the transnational Panama Ports Company <PPC>, S.A), 
won the concession from the Panamanian government to manage both ports for a period of 20 years. Since 
securing another contract in 2016 to upgrade and expand facilities PPC, which operates a port on the Pacific 
and Panamanian Atlantic sides, is spending some $140 million to modernize the Balboa and Cristóbal facilities. 
According to the company, the Balboa port modernization program includes the construction of 350 meters of 
deep draft wharf and 8.4 hectares of patio to store containers equipped with three Post Panama port cranes 
and seven port gantry cranes with a capacity to handle 400,000 units annually (Gandásegui, 2000).
China’s offered infrastructural investments have come in response to Latin American needs. China’s 2008 
White Paper for Latin America, outlined its economic and political intentions for the region. But Chinese firms 
are seen by some analysts to be relatively independent and often operate in divergence from Beijing’s goals 
(Norris 2016). What’s more, in the post-Cold War era, there is a need to overcome neighbouring countries’ 
reluctance to involve themselves to strategic competition. Accordingly, China quells these fears by reinforcing 
the five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-
aggression, non-intervention of one country in the internal affairs of another, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence.
In China’s second white paper on Latin America, published in 2016, Beijing established its priorities in the 
region: energy and natural resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and 
technological innovation, and information technologies (which is reflected in the Cooperation Plan between 
China and CELAC for the period 2015-2019, which sets out seven priority areas and others of implementation: 
policy and security, infrastructure and transportation, trade, investment and finance, agriculture, industry, 
science and technology, cooperation in environmental matters, cultural exchange, cooperation in other areas 
and its implementation) (CELAC, 2018).
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3. TAIWANESE AND CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN PANAMA
Diplomacy between the “two Chinas”—the ROC and PRC—forced the two to compete for influence in 
Central America and consequently offer substantial donations for state infrastructure and exchange programs 
(academic, authorities, representatives of organizations, etc.). Beyond that there was direct efforts to influence 
politics through the financing of electoral campaigns of preferred political leaders (Wallace, 2018). In the case 
of Panama specifically, by treating Panama as a logistical and financial centre, both Taiwan and China helped 
develop the country while strengthening their respective presence in the region and facilitating the commercial 
relations of its companies. 
But Panama’s management of the diplomatic switch from Taipei to Beijing came as a shock to Taiwan and 
the US. In 2018, Joseph Wu, the general secretary of the Taiwan Presidential Office, said that ROC-Panama 
relations had broken down as the result of an “unfair act, which China has made possible through intimidation 
diplomacy, offerings and the purchase of diplomatic allies” (Vidal, 2017). Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
said that President Varela, by breaking official diplomatic relations, “had ignored the friendship between 
his countries and the efforts that Taiwan had made to help the general development of Panama” (Sparks, 
2017). Taiwan immediately terminated all bilateral cooperation projects and withdrew its diplomatic staff 
and technical advisers from the country, adding that it will not participate in some ROC-PRC competition for 
influence. Taiwan was outraged, namely because in previous months the Panamanian deputy foreign minister 
had indicated that he did not foresee changes in the alliance.
Then-Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela justified his rupturing of Panama-ROC relations by arguing 
that the China represents 20 percent of the world population and constitutes the second largest economy in 
the world, and that relations with Beijing would not prevent Taiwan from being involved in the economy.
4. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC REACTIONS TO CHANGING DIPLOMATIC TIES
On October 18, 2018, Panama’s long-time ally, the United States, reacted immediately and aggressively to 
then-Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela decision to establish diplomatic relations the PRC.  Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo visited Panama soon after and in an interview with Panamanian social media warned 
Panama to “have wide eyes regarding China” (El Panamá América, 2018). The United States Embassy in 
Panama, meanwhile, said that Pompeo’s visit was intended to reaffirm that the United States is Panama’s main 
partner, and that Panama should, therefore, exercise caution in their relations with the PRC (Bonilla, 2018).
The Panamanian reaction to the PRC’s new presence in their country was diverse—a result of the process’s 
lacking transparency. Economists, businessmen, academics, and lawyers asked to negotiate calmly, while 
producers requested greater protection. The livestock sector expressed its fear that the signed Free Trade 
Agreement with the European Union would fall apart, and that they would not make up these losses by exporting 
meat or milk to China.
China is the main user of the Colon Free Zone and the second of the Panama Canal, through which six 
percent of world trade passes. According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industries of Panama, “Panama 
mainly exports coffee, bovine hides and fishmeal to the Chinese market, while China imports high-tech products 
such as cell phones and televisions into our country, as well as textiles, tires, toys, slippers and shoes, among 
others” (Garrido, 2018).
On the other hand, Panama’s Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Agriculture considered the relationship 
positively, saying that the country’s association with the PRC will enhance Panama’s competitive advantages. 
The body points out that “entrepreneurs expect the possibility of opening a trade agreement with a country of 
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more than 1.3 billion people, increasing exports and imports, in addition, new investments will be attracted to 
Panama, especially in the technological and logistical field, to name a few” (Forbes, 2017). The Panama Hotel 
Association concurs.
Panama is a logistics hub, and accordingly will attract Chinese companies, banks and the award of mega 
works. Diplomatic relations with the PRC are now a fact; the implications of this are diverse and effect all areas 
of education, health, science, technology, environment, energy, maritime, migration, tourism, agribusiness, 
social problems, logistics, trade, economics, and politics.
And yet, the 2019 election of Laurentino Cortizo Cohen led to the pausing of these agreements. Cohen’s 
government suspended the Free Trade Agreement negotiations with China and the rejected a plan to connect 
by railway the capital city with the Province of Chiriquí and possibly Costa Rica. Cohen’s momentary pause 
allows Panamanians to better analyse their commitments and implications, thus allowing the new government 
to better consider the effect of its Chinese relationship on Panama’s national interests.
5. CONCLUSION
Chinese diplomacy in the 21st century comprises commercial expansion and the consolidation of power, 
with Beijing seeking to ensure close ties with emerging Latin American economies through cultural diplomacy, 
investment and cooperation. Panama is strategically important to China in no small part because of the Central 
American country’s raw materials and propensity to consume Chinese products and investments. Taiwan’s 
position was increasingly untenable as Beijing sought to exert its economic and diplomatic power in the region.
The Chinese government understands Panama’s strategic value to its global amibitions. Panama 
government’s decision to adhere to the Chinese initiative of the Silk Road and enhances its role as the key 
nodule, thanks to the Panama Canal, linking the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The Panama Canal is seen as an 
interoceanic bridge of China’s New Silk Road, and, according to Chinese Minister of Overseas Affairs of China 
Qiu Yuanping, the PRC’s agreements with Panama constituted the most important diplomatic achievement for 
China during the year 2017 (Yau, 2015).  
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